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Abstract
In 2013 the state of California launched a cap-and-trade program with a groundbreaking
protocol for improved forest management (IFM), providing a framework to monetize
carbon sequestration in managed forests. Through in-depth interviews and document
review, this research examines Californiaʼs IFM program development as a case study in
stakeholder-engaged ecosystem commodiﬁcation. We consider how diverse, vested-interest
actors contested rival program design options by using the familiar narratives of ecological
modernization, green governmentality, and civic environmentalism. The results reveal
the beneﬁts and complexities of delegating methodological design to stakeholders who
seek direct participation in the market, and highlight the challenges of balancing mul-
tiple program objectives, including environmental beneﬁts, legitimacy and market recep-
tion, and landowner participation potential. This research provides a unique window
into the complex process of forest-offset program design and offers broader lessons for
ecosystem markets currently being designed and implemented globally.
In 2013 the state of California launched a cap-and-trade program with a pioneer-
ing protocol for improved forest management (IFM), providing a framework to
monetize forests’ potential as greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction sinks, through
the production of forest carbon offsets. Programs monetizing forest offsets date
to the 1990s, spanning voluntary schemes for carbon footprint reduction and
regulatory programs, such as the emissions trading system of the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.1 However, methodologies
guiding forest-offset production are yet unstandardized. High variation in forest-
offset program design reﬂects both technical and political challenges, including
difﬁculty measuring and monetizing terrestrial carbon, as well as policy debates
surrounding the use of forests as GHG sinks (Boyd et al. 2008). Amid this method-
ological experimentation and uncertainty, California’s IFM protocol emerged with
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original deﬁnitions of baseline, permanence, and natural forest management, crafted
by the stakeholder participants of two successive workgroups. Because this oc-
curred in a relatively transparent public process, we have the opportunity to assess
California’s IFM program development as a case study in stakeholder-engaged eco-
system commodiﬁcation. We asked: How did workgroup participants negotiate
key and consequential design features? What environmental governance dis-
courses were brought to bear on speciﬁc design elements? And what does this re-
veal about stakeholders’ ability to shape the design and functioning of payment
for ecosystem service (PES) markets through access to program design?
We found that both state and nonstate actors played key roles in creating
the IFM protocol, with the state setting the legal groundwork and convening
workgroup participants who sought to create a workable market solution, while
excluding stakeholders opposed to marketizing carbon. Stakeholders selected
for IFM workgroup participation made policy decisions about who and what
to incentivize, which frequently favored their own market entrance. This was
evident through a comparison of separately produced IFM protocol iterations,
formulated by workgroups of different stakeholder compositions. This analysis
revealed that the original, land-trust-designed protocol included provisions favor-
able to conservation landowners, such as requisite placement of conservation
easements on project lands. However, a second protocol, produced in collabora-
tion with large commercial forest interests, signiﬁcantly altered market access
through removal of the conservation easement requirement and inclusion of
even-aged management (or clear-cutting). Analysis further revealed that vested-
interest actors lobbied for particular design preferences using familiar forest-offset
narratives. Here, we build on the ﬁndings of Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006),
who articulated three discourses present in global forest-offset policy discussions:
ecological modernization, green governmentality, and civic environmentalism
(Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006). Our results show that these discourses drove
debates over core methodological preferences, explaining much about how these
novel goods are successfully brought to market.
This article begins by reviewing the complexities of delegating PES pro-
gram design to vested-interest actors. Second, we explain the framework of
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006), highlighting the tensions and overlap between
the dominant narratives informing forest-offset policy. Thereafter, a chronology
of IFM protocol development details the evolving stakeholder debates over
baseline, permanence, and natural forest management—criteria selected here
because they shape program participation. This narrative is divided into two
sections addressing successive workgroups’ efforts (Figure 1): The ﬁrst developed
a protocol for California’s voluntary offset market; the second signiﬁcantly
revised the original protocol for use in the eventual cap-and-trade market.2
2. Multiple iterations were released of each protocol, reﬂecting adjustments made by the Climate
Action Reserve. However, this study is concerned with the broader differences between the
protocols produced by each workgroup.
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We conclude by looking globally, considering the relevance of California’s IFM
protocol development for ecosystem markets worldwide.
Analytical Approach
Payment for Ecosystem Services
Forest landowners’ actions provide ecosystem services such as wildlife habitat
and diversity, watershed improvement, scenic landscapes, and carbon storage;
PES programs like California’s IFM protocol encourage management for these
beneﬁts by “compensating landowners for the many public goods they [other-
wise] provide at little or no cost to consumers.”3 Governing bodies have options
for inﬂuencing landowners’ behavior—including direct state regulation, taxa-
tion, and state subsidy programs. Yet the last decade has seen a turn toward
PES as a favored tool for environmental governance, in part because it is volun-
tary, incentive-based, and purports to achieve environmental, economic, and
social beneﬁts (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010). Further, it ﬁts within a neoliberal
paradigm, by theoretically allowing free markets to direct economic decision-
making (Engel et al. 2008). PES was popularized in a sustainable development
context in the 1990s; however, climate mitigation is increasingly driving demand
for PESmarkets, including forest-offset programs (Corbera et al. 2010; van Kooten
and Sohgen 2007).
Analysis of PES program construction has considered both the beneﬁts and
complexities of delegating methodological design to vested-interest stakeholders.
3. Jenkins, Dylan, and Matt Smith. Domestic Forest Carbon Offsets: Is There a Path to Market? The
Consultant (Association of Consultant Foresters), January 2013, 25.
Figure 1
Protocol Development Timeline
Acronyms: SB, Senate Bill; AB, Assembly Bill; ARB, Air Resources Board.
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One perspective is that empowering self-interested actors helps create a more
usable program with wider engagement (Wunder et al. 2008). However, concern
also exists that because PES programs are developed within “particular environ-
mental, economic, social, and political contexts, [they] are subject to the push-
and-pull of many stakeholders” (Engel et al. 2008, 668).
Wide variation in forest carbon protocol standards, particularly in fun-
damental features such as carbon accounting, suggests that the stakeholder
inﬂuence in program design may stem from policy choices made about
how to monetize a new good. Indeed, analyses of alternative forest-offset pro-
tocols found sizeable differences in likely project revenue, cost, and ability to
participate (Galik et al. 2009, 2012). For instance, project development ex-
penses alone were projected to vary between $0 and $500 per hectare, based
on methodology (Galik et al. 2012). These ﬁndings suggest that forest-offset
program design is subjective and yet consequential, warranting detailed inves-
tigation into how diverse actors inﬂuence the design and functioning of PES
markets.
Forest Carbon Policy: “A Discursive Mineﬁeld”
Forest sinks have been consistently controversial since they were ﬁrst nego-
tiated during implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Boyd et al. (2008) de-
scribe the range of divisive arguments concerning environmental integrity,
market efﬁciency, and methodological design options for forest carbon seques-
tration, comprising what they call the “politics of sinks.” Bäckstrand and
Lövbrand (2006) pursue a similar theme, using a discursive analytic framework
to examine conﬂicting knowledge claims, asserting that forest offsets are “one
of the most disputed ideas in climate governance” (52). In their framework,
three metadiscourses intertwine in forest-offset policy rhetoric. Ecological mod-
ernization provides a legitimizing discourse which promotes forest offsets as
climate mitigation tools with maximum market ﬂexibility and efﬁciency; green
governmentality operationalizes forest sinks with specialized “eco-knowledges”
that are necessary to measure, monitor, and manage forest offsets as tradable
goods; and civic environmentalism democratizes forest-offset negotiations by
empowering nonstate actors, such as NGOs, to safeguard forest carbon pro-
gram environmental and social integrity. While some important overlap is
identiﬁed, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand also highlight points of contention be-
tween these narratives, which fuel controversy over the use and design of forest-
offset programs. For example, they cite tension between the maximum market
efﬁcacy promoted by ecological modernization and the environmental safeguards
endorsed by civic environmentalism. Their analysis clariﬁes how forest sink nar-
ratives may translate into climate policy, but it focuses exclusively on programs
incentivizing forest plantations in tropical countries. We apply their discursive
framework in a new context: the creation of managed forest-offset protocols in
the US.
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Forest Carbon Revenue in the US
We also investigate the relationship between protocol design and landowners’
potential for market engagement. The development of voluntary forest carbon
market opportunities in the US throughout the 2000s generated interest in who
might beneﬁt from these new, nontraditional revenue opportunities. The liter-
ature especially analyzed nonindustrial private landowners’ willingness and
ability to participate in emerging forest carbon programs. Barriers to market
entry were frequently identiﬁed, especially among small-scale and economically
marginal landowners, due to up-front costs and rigorous requirements for
accounting, monitoring, and permanence (Charnley et al. 2010; Fischer and
Charnley 2011; Fletcher et al. 2009; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Miller
et al. 2012; Thompson and Hansen 2012; Wade and Moseley 2011). This pointed
toward a “precision versus practicality paradox,” suggesting that program technical
rigor reduces landowner access (Gosnell et al. 2011).
From this period of US forest carbon market development, California’s
IFM protocol emerged as the lone regulatory forest-offset program, and many
thus consider it the chief forest carbon revenue opportunity open to US land-
owners.4 However, research has shown that the conservativeness, costliness, and
prescriptiveness of California’s IFM protocol bode poorly for economically mar-
ginal landowners (Galik et al. 2009, 2012; Remucal et al. 2013; Russell-Roy
et al. 2014). While limited in scope, this literature suggests a lack of ﬁt between
the landowners who might beneﬁt most from carbon revenue, such as those at
risk of selling their land and fragmenting the landscape because of loss of eco-
nomic viability, and the feasibility of market entry. Based on indications that
California IFM protocol design is shaping market entry, we consider the policy
choices that led to its current form.
Research Methods
We utilized a qualitative research design consisting of in-depth, semistructured
interviews, with additional data drawn from a document review of workgroup
meeting notes and attendance at forest carbon policy meetings and conferences.
Thirty-six individuals participated in the study, including seventeen protocol
development workgroup participants (Table 1). This sample does not compre-
hensively represent all potential stakeholders, but targeted those primarily re-
sponsible for shaping IFM protocol design, which was the focus of this case.
The interview participants were deliberately selected. Through meeting minutes,
we identiﬁed all workgroup members, then speciﬁcally solicited private land-
owner representatives as well as forest veriﬁcation and academic interests, and
excluded from the sample those who did not regularly attend meetings and
4. Caldwell et al. 2014; Smith, Matthew. US Carbon Markets: Where Are They Now—and How
Did They Get Here? Forestry Source, February 2010, 5.
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public landowner representatives (e.g., US Forest Service). All but one of the
solicited informants from the protocol development workgroups granted our
interview request. Stakeholders outside the workgroups were selected by review-
ing public comments in response to draft protocol versions, and included pro-
fessional carbon developers, consulting foresters, and environmental NGOs. The
interviews took place between fall of 2013 and summer of 2014 and lasted one
to two hours each.
We used customized interview schedules with all participants, based on
individuals’ particular realms of expertise. Some questions were asked of each
participant, including items investigating preferred protocol design elements
and supportive rationale, such as “Which baseline accounting method did
you support and why?” and “What arguments were made for and against po-
tential permanence mechanisms?” However, the interview content was wide-
ranging. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. When
possible we excerpt these transcripts, to convey the results in the participants’
own words.
In analyzing the transcripts we conducted open and then focused coding,
following the methods of Corbin and Strauss (2014). This involved identiﬁca-
tion, reduction, and categorization of themes. We then delineated descriptive
codes according to stakeholder category, in order to investigate how the expec-
tations for protocol design differed by interest group. Finally, we compared these
codes to the framework of Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) to conceptualize the
relationship between stakeholders and familiar forest sink narratives. The codes
grouped clearly by stakeholder category (Table 2). However, categorical overlap
and heterogeneity were both common, and these complexities provide impor-
tant discussion points below.
Table 1
Participants Categorized by Stakeholder Group
Participant Label
Number of
Participants Participant Breakdown
Protocol development
workgroup (1&2) members
17 Land trust: N=5
Timber industry: N=5
Science/academia: N=4
Other: N=3
Stakeholders outside
the workgroups
19 Consulting foresters: N=6
For-proﬁt carbon developers: N=4
Environmental NGOs: N=7
Other: N=2
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The Spadework: Creating, Testing, and Promoting a
Voluntary Market for Forest Offsets
California’s regulatory IFM protocol emerged from an important period of
experimentation and revision that took place in a voluntary market for offset
trading (Figure 1). Early advocates broke ground in methodology design by
helping articulate the core forest-offset product speciﬁcations of “real, addi-
tional, quantiﬁable, veriﬁable, and permanent,” at a time when the deﬁnitions
Table 2
List of Metadiscourses and Illustrative Codes, Based on Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006)
Discourse Description Illustrative Codes
Ecological
Modernization
Emphasis on cost
efﬁciency, market
ﬂexibility
• A case for even-aged management
• Maximum carbon accounting
• Co-beneﬁts as hindrances to
climate beneﬁt
• Emphasis on offset supply
sufﬁciency
• Offsets as the only way to grow
the economy
Green
Governmentality
Emphasis on scientiﬁc
precision and
measurability
• Veriﬁability as a guiding principle
• A need for credibility
• Set-up to be conservative at
every step
• Revisions aim to reduce gaming
potential
• Need for prescriptiveness
• Setting a gold standard
• Objective of real, additional,
quantiﬁable, veriﬁable, permanent
management
Civic
Environmentalism
Emphasis on forests
as sources of biological
diversity, livelihood
and cultural values
• Importance of co-beneﬁts
• Importance of landowner incentive
• Forest offsets as the greenest offsets
• Like a conservation easement
• Like a management plan
• Reduces deforestation
• Nonextractive revenue
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of these terms were not yet resolved. Besides advancing forest-offset quantiﬁ-
cation, the efforts of Workgroup One also gained political and public support
for forest-based offsets as GHG reduction tools. The success of this voluntary
market facilitated the later inclusion of forest-based offsets in California’s regu-
latory cap-and-trade program, by demonstrating that carbon from managed
forests could be quantiﬁed and sold as legitimate market commodities.
An Effort Instigated and Run by Land Trusts
The IFM protocol was predominately crafted by nonstate actors; however,
the state spurred and helped shape forest-offset trading through legislation.
California Senate Bill (SB) 1771 (ch. 1018, Cal. Stat. 2000) was a critical ﬁrst
step. Contextualized by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, SB 1771 aimed to make
California an early actor in a new age of GHG regulation by establishing the
California Climate Action Registry (CCAR), a database for industry emitters to
voluntarily monitor and report GHG emissions.
San Francisco–based land trust Paciﬁc Forest Trust, which had worked
previously on international forest carbon sequestration policies, saw the
creation of CCAR as an opportunity to promote forest offsets in California.5
Pursuing this goal, they wrote and sponsored a second piece of legislation, SB
812 (ch. 423, Cal. Stat. 2002) clarifying the role of CCAR to include developing
a methodology for the production and sale of forest offsets to registry users. This
legislation articulated core concepts that had ongoing inﬂuence over methodo-
logical design. However, many details, including the forest carbon accounting
framework, were left open and were delegated to a workgroup, which was con-
vened by the state in 2003 (Figure 1, Workgroup One). Land trusts were the
major workgroup participants, with a small number of additional members
from the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the forest
industry, and a California electric utility that later purchased forest offsets
in the voluntary market.
Workgroup One was small, due partly to uncertainty about the demand
for offsets and skepticism that carbon projects on managed forests could beneﬁt
landowners on a broad scale. Explained one participant: “People didn’t think
this was real. Companies weren’t beating down the door to be part of [protocol
development] because they just didn’t think this was going to go anywhere”
(Interview 2, Land Trust). Despite this, hopes that forest carbon could facilitate
forestland conservation fueled land trust involvement. These early advocates
promoted carbon offsets as an alternative revenue stream for managed forests,
5. Conservation land trusts are private, nonproﬁt organizations pursuing land and resource con-
servation, through conservation easements and fee acquisition. Conservation easements are legal,
generally perpetual agreements that transfer land and resource rights from landowners to third
parties, such as land trusts or government agencies.
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capable of preventing parcelization and incentivizing sustainable timber man-
agement (Best and Wayburn 2001; Wayburn et al. 2000).
The Workgroup One participants borrowed some concepts from existing
GHG accounting conventions, but much of their work broke new ground to
avoid the failures of earlier programs, which included low utilization and pro-
hibitive transaction costs. One of the primary changes for California was target-
ing managed forests. This was seen as a signiﬁcant advance because it made
climate goals potentially compatible with other forest management objectives,
such as timber harvest. We focus on three components of the early protocol design:
baseline, permanence, and “natural forest management.”
Baseline: Establishing a Performance Standard
A baseline is used to demonstrate additionality—that is, greater carbon seques-
tration than would have occurred in the absence of project development.
Previous forest carbon accounting had used baseline scenarios tailored to indi-
vidual projects’ management options, resulting in baselines that were quali-
tative in nature and difﬁcult to verify, and that relied on landowner-supplied
information about the costs and beneﬁts of alternative land management
options (World Resources Institute 2006, 23). This approach was viewed as a
participation deterrent, due to the time-consuming burdens placed on project
developers. Explained one interviewee: “It was like writing a novel every time
you did a carbon project. So it was very, very inefﬁcient” (Interview 28, Land
Trust). Workgroup One members therefore favored a performance standard
baseline: a consistent, quantitative analysis that could be applied across numerous
projects, more clearly conveying risk and return to project developers. Explained
one interviewee:
You need to make it so that people know going into the project what they
are getting into, and they can do feasibility assessments, they can determine
ahead of time whether it is going to be worth the effort … to make actual
expensive up-front investments in order to get the project going. (Interview 28,
Land Trust)
The forest regulatory context of California made the performance standard
baseline possible. Unlike most states, California has a well-established, pre-
scriptive, and measurable set of guidelines articulated in its Forest Practice
Rules, pursuant to the 1973 California Forest Practices Act. Workgroup One uti-
lized these rules as a framework for their baseline methodology, allowing pro-
ject developers to determine the economic potential of forestland within the
constraints of familiar regulatory restrictions. By considering what landowners
could have harvested, this method rewarded forests up-front for past growth
that exceeded what was required by law, a condition that recognized the value
of older forests. At a time when alternative forest carbon protocols credited
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landowners for new growth only,6 California workgroup members recognized
past beneﬁcial stewardship, a strategy supported by land trusts:
You wanted to say, thank you very much for not having liquidated your
forest down to the economically optimal levels and legally allowed levels.
Thank you. And here is an alternative revenue stream that will enable you to
afford to keep doing that in the face of very compelling economics to do
otherwise. (Interview 28, Land Trust)
Yet the baseline premised on California’s Forest Practice Rules provoked
criticism for inﬂating credits by allowing conservation-minded landowners to
assume the maximum harvest allowable by law under their baseline scenarios,
without a clear intention to actually harvest at high levels. Nonetheless, this
accounting approach was defended by land trusts as a holistic way to consider
forests’ twin climate beneﬁts of carbon sequestration and storage.
Permanence via Conservation Easements
In designing permanence protocols, Workgroup One members pushed for a
requirement that landowners place conservation easements on project lands
as a means of ensuring that carbon sequestration was permanently maintained.
Again, stakeholders drew on familiar tools, selecting conservation easements
because they were well-established, legal mechanisms with reputations for con-
tractual strength. Importantly, easements were viewed as superior to other pos-
sible permanence tools because they created perpetual obligations to maintain
forests as forests, and because they allowed ongoing third-party monitoring by
easement holders such as land trusts. These factors offered ways of dealing with
inherent uncertainties in the lifespan of atmospheric carbon—that is, the question
of how long sequestered forest carbon must be stored to wholly offset emitted
carbon tons.
Co-Beneﬁts and “Natural Forest Management”
The obligation to produce co-beneﬁts—ecological improvements beyond carbon
sequestration, such as habitat creation on project lands—was a third major ele-
ment of protocol design, articulated through a set of rules termed “natural forest
management.” By requiring landowners to manage for a diversity of timber spe-
cies and mixed-age classes, it sought to prevent “carbon farms” that maximized
carbon sequestration at the expense of ecological integrity. This requirement was
a key innovation of the early protocol and one that had continued inﬂuence over
the program as it evolved. However, unlike with the baseline and permanence
requirements, uncertainty clouded the natural forest management component.
6. Such as the Chicago Climate Exchange, the only alternative IFM protocol at the time.
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As one carbon registry staff member explained: “You can ask a hundred different
people what natural forest management means, and you will get a hundred dif-
ferent responses” (Interview 8, Registry Staff ).
A Need for Demonstration Projects
By 2005, Workgroup One had completed an innovative forest protocol, and dem-
onstration projects were needed to provide evidence that the methodology could
successfully bring offsets from managed forests to market. A select group of land
trusts and conservation landowners accepted the early market uncertainty and
developed California’s ﬁrst forest carbon projects on their own lands. Paciﬁc Forest
Trust—the prominent architect of SB 812 and Workgroup One contributor—led
the experiment by registering the ﬁrst carbon project on 2,200 acres of forest-
land under their management.
During this time, a bifurcation began between non-California forest carbon
trading schemes—such as the failed Chicago Climate Exchange—and California’s
market, which started to command higher prices. Signs of a cap-and-trade market
on the horizon also drew the attention of a broader scope of potential land-
owner participants. Larger industrial timberland owners who had thus far been
“keeping an eye over the fence,” as one stakeholder described it, watched the
opportunities opening in California’s forest-offset market with greater interest
(Interview 2, Land Trust). Yet attention from a widening pool of actors also
fueled critiques about the program. Concern surfaced that California’s early pro-
tocol favored a narrow group of participants, essentially nonproﬁt land trusts
who were willing and able to meet conservation-oriented requirements, with what
one interviewee described as: “projects [that] conveniently ﬁt into the protocol”
(Interview 3, Land Trust). The limited nature of participation via early demon-
stration projects therefore set the stage for calls to improve the protocol and to
expand its scope of landowner participation.
“Let’s Open Things Up”: Revising the Original Protocol to
Meet the Expectations of Diverse Stakeholders
The passage of Assembly Bill (AB) 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006, was a seminal legislative event with implications for forest offsets. This
bill bound larger industries in California to mandatory GHG emissions reduc-
tions and signaled the likely use of a cap-and-trade market as a primary tool.
This suggested the need to revise the early protocol to make it compliance-
ready—for instance, by including more acreage for an expanded market. This
presented an opportunity to alter core aspects of the protocol for newly inter-
ested stakeholders—including the California forest industry, who took excep-
tion to speciﬁc aspects of the protocol perceived to preclude their market
participation, and carbon veriﬁers, who sought a baseline revision and increased
rigor.
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Under pressure from the new interests, the California Air Resources Board,
tasked with implementing AB 32, reconvened a larger and more diverse work-
group to rewrite the protocol (Figure 1, Workgroup Two). Speciﬁc instructions
to the Workgroup Two participants indicated they should study ways to “expand
its use, and consider how it could be used for private landowners, commercial
landowners, as well as public landowners, and also consider how it might be
used outside of California” (Interview 8, Registry Staff ). Thus, a desire to “get
more players in the game,” as one state agent put it, was central to the founding
directive (Interview 14, State Agency).
Convened in 2007, Workgroup Two therefore added voices from the forest
industry, employees of state agencies, and carbon veriﬁers capable of providing
technical expertise. The self-interests were wide-ranging as these actors nego-
tiated key elements of the protocol revision, including the baseline, permanence,
and natural forest management (Table 2). Following sections review the major
debates and their implications for program design and engagement.
Recasting the Baseline: Building Credibility
Baseline-related debates about additionality and rigor, stemming from the early
protocol’s crediting of conservation-owned forests for maximum allowable harvest
under California law, were especially contentious in Workgroup Two. Veriﬁer
stakeholders, in particular, called for a more conservative baseline, yet land trust
participants feared this would reduce landowners’ incentives to participate, leaving
carbon-rich forests as “sitting ducks” for extraction.
Also present was a debate about the value of previously captured carbon in
mature forests versus new sequestration in growing timber. Critics, in particular
industrial timber stakeholders, claimed that the original baseline underappre-
ciated the carbon sequestration potential of younger forests and proposed broad-
ening incentives to forests of a variety of age classes. Explained one participant:
The debate is, okay here’s an old growth Doug-ﬁr forest. The carbon is
already captured … maybe folks who were more interested in gathering
and holding old forest structure would argue, well look the carbon that’s
there is valuable. And [industry] would say: “Well yeah, that’s ﬁne … but
give me recognition for the carbon that we’re capturing, because we’re grow-
ing so many young trees.” (Interview 12, Extension Agent)
Proponents of baseline revision—who aimed to “bring forests in at a variety
of starting points”—also sought ways to make forest carbon sequestration more
compatible with management for timber production (Interview 22, NGO).
Reconciliation was reached through a hybrid methodology that rewarded both
standing forest conservation and rehabilitation of cutover lands. “Common-practice”
guidelines based on nationwide forest biomass data were implemented to address
concerns over consistency and stringency. Common practice became the lower limit
for baseline modeling, and forests starting above this metric could still earn credit
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forwhat theymight otherwise have harvested, butwith the common-practice number
as a ﬂoor. On the other hand, forests starting below common practice—potentially
degraded lands or forests that had been recently harvested—could enter themarket
at their current maturity level and gradually earn credit for growth after project
initiation. This solution also established baseline rules not tied to California-
speciﬁc forest regulation, facilitating the goal of national program expansion.
A New Permanence Mechanism: Expanding Access
Permanence also became contested terrain within Workgroup Two amid debate
about how to appropriately ensure that sequestered carbon was retained for
meaningful lengths of time. Critics called the requirement for conservation
easements the “biggest obstacle” under the early protocol and expressed concern
that this requirement foreclosed participation among landowners unable or
unwilling to enter perpetual agreements. Not only did conservation easements
require lengthy negotiations and funding complexities, but their appeal was
very speciﬁc, limited typically to land trusts and select family forest owners,
and rare among the forest industry and tribes.
Some within Workgroup Two asserted that easements might not actually
ensure permanence, highlighting their inability to deal with “reversals”—the
voluntary or involuntary loss of forest carbon stocks due to wildﬁre, disease,
wind, or over-harvesting. Conservation easements prohibited over-harvest via
legal contract, but they lacked insurance plans for dealing with losses in carbon
stocks that could still occur. Many Workgroup Two participants advocated for
permanence tools that could “make projects whole again” if reversals transpired.
Support gathered around a wholly new system that required landowners to set
aside portions of earned credits in insurance accounts known as “buffer pools,”
which could be drawn on in the event of reversals.
Ultimately a majority of Workgroup Two members adopted the viewpoint
that conservation easements were not sufﬁcient to mitigate reversals. A 100-year
contractual obligation to maintain carbon stocks past the sale of the last credit,
along with buffer pools, was selected as a replacement. However, this timeline
was still recognized as a potential hurdle for many landowners. As one forester
explained: “From a practical point, one hundred years was way too long [for some
landowners]. From a business point of view, you go beyond 50 years, it’s kind of
forever” (Interview 16, Forester). Thus, while a signiﬁcant boost in accessibility to
some, for others the shift from a permanent easement to a hundred-year com-
mitment may have been a difference without a distinction.
“Natural Forest Management” Revisited: Clarifying a Disputed Concept
Natural forest management, a vague and disputed concept from the early proto-
col, now needed clearer articulation. For many—including land trust stakeholders
as well as environmental advocates who monitored protocol development from
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outside the process—providing these beneﬁts was extremely important. As one
environmental activist explained: “If all you are getting is carbon out of your
forest [offset] project, then it is just a one-to-one swap between your smokestack
and your forest. And it is pretty hard to get too excited about that” (Interview 23,
Conservation NGO).
Yet concern existed among forest industry and other forestry professionals
that these constraints just “didn’t quite make sense” in the context of forest
management (Interview 16, Forester). One criticism was that natural forest
management requirements impinged on full carbon sequestration beneﬁt.
Questioned one forest industry workgroup member: “If I can take a place and
plant an exotic species and not cause any other [regulatory] problem by doing
that, then why can’t I count that carbon?” (Interview 18, Timber Industry).
While some emphasized incompatibilities between management-for-carbon
and management-for-co-beneﬁts, others argued more simply that these require-
ments introduced unnecessary complexity into forest-offset criteria. Advised one
participant: “In a carbon protocol, let’s focus on carbon and how to quantify
it as rigorously as possible. Let’s not throw in other barriers” (Interview 25,
Registry Staff ).
However, participants shared a recognition that natural forest management
guidelines served a range of political purposes, including production of a “sheen”
of co-beneﬁts to help with “political acceptance” of the protocol (Interview 18,
Timber Industry). Interviewees indicated awareness that these provisions could
increase the perception of forest projects’ environmental integrity for offset
buyers seeking a strong environmental cachet, which might boost their appeal
and monetary value over competing carbon offset options. These were viewed
as important considerations, given that forest-based offsets impart risks on buyers
that alternative offsets do not, due to the ongoing possibility of reversal.
Even though the beneﬁts of natural forest management were recognized,
major debates remained in considering which management practices would be
permitted. A central question concerned the inclusion of even-aged management,
or “clear-cutting.” Though common to industrial timbermanagement, this practice
is maligned by many environmental groups, and was generally considered ex-
cluded from the original protocol via the requirement that participants manage
for a “diversity of age classes.” Industrial interests participating in the second work-
group called vocally for its inclusion, arguing: “the protocols aren’t going to work
[without clear-cutting]…. They’re going to exclude such a huge huge area of forest-
land ownership that your offset program’s going to not have adequate offsets to be
able to go forward” (Interview 21, Timber Industry). Even-aged management
practitioners reminded critics that IFM was meant to be integrated with manage-
ment for timber, of which even-aged management was a legal and common tool.
The ultimate inclusion of even-aged management in the forest-offset
protocol appeased timber interests, but it complicated the 2009 nationwide
extension of the program. While the California Forest Practice Rules limited
clear-cut sizes and mandated that trees grow to a certain age, other regions of
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the country had few such restrictions. The natural forest management rules were
therefore amended to include similar limitations, though these changes posed
problems for some non-California landowners by increasing the opportunity
costs of IFM program participation. One workgroup member gave the example
of the southeastern US pine industry, which harvests trees at a much younger
age than is allowed under the natural forest management guidelines, concluding
“right, wrong, or indifferent, it eliminates them from being in this protocol”
(Interview 18, Timber Industry).
Changes between the early protocol versions and the cap-and-trade pro-
tocol are summarized in Table 3.
Discussion
This article has explored how diverse participants of successive workgroups
negotiated key and consequential program design features in the production
of an original IFM cap-and-trade carbon protocol, seeking to harness managed
forests as tools for atmospheric GHG reduction. The multiyear protocol develop-
ment process produced deﬁnitions of baseline, permanence, and natural forest
management that changed over time, reﬂecting competing expectations from
vested-interest actors seeking to create and legitimize a new market good (Figure 1,
Table 3). We now return to the questions that guided this research, particularly:
What lessons does this offer for stakeholder-engaged PES program design?
PES and the Determination of Winners and Losers via Program Design
Unsurprisingly, the results show that vested-interest actors lobbied for design
elements that increased their access to new carbon-based revenue streams,
supporting the assertion of Engel et al. (2008). The early, land-trust-designed
protocol favored conservation-minded landowners, and indeed supported project
Table 3
Summary of Major Changes in Protocol Components
Early Protocol Cap-and-Trade Protocol
Baseline to Determine
Additionality
Baseline of maximum
allowable harvest under
California Forest Practice
Rules
▪ Nationwide standards
▪ Hybrid approach—start above
or below Common Practice
Permanence Mechanism Conservation easement
required
▪ 100-year commitment
▪ Buffer pool for reversals
Co-beneﬁts via Natural
Forest Management
Perception that even-aged
management was excluded
▪ Even-aged management
explicitly included
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development on lands owned and managed by the land trusts themselves. How-
ever, the impending cap-and-trade market compelled the state to reconvene a
larger workgroup. Here new actors, particularly forest industry stakeholders,
negotiated revisions meant to increase their market access, including removal
of the conservation easement requirement and inclusion of even-aged manage-
ment. These revisions were framed by efforts to improve the protocol, based on
the lessons learned through ﬁeld-testing in a voluntary context and from failed
carbon markets elsewhere. However, the design decisions also mirrored shifting
stakeholder inﬂuence, and frequently resulted in policy choices favoring some
workgroup members while detracting from the participation potential of
others—for example, in debates over whether to reward older versus younger
forests in the baseline criteria.
Stakeholders not only asserted particular realms of self-interest, they did so
by invoking the logic of familiar discourses, echoing the framework of Bäckstrand
and Lövbrand (2006; see our Table 4).
Table 4
Framework of Discursive Support for the Commodiﬁcation of Forest Offsets
Discursive Groups Workgroup Participants Illustrative Quote
Ecological
Modernization
Timber and carbon
development industries
“So at some point … [when]
we’ve squeezed every ounce of
carbon out of the economy,
now how do we increase the
economy? You know, grow, and
not increase atmospheric CO2?
That’s where the offset world
comes in.” (Interview 18,
Timber Industry)
Green
Governmentality
Veriﬁers, science/academia “If [the protocol] is not credible,
people will not engage with it….
It all depends on the integrity
and the technical rigor and
underpinnings of the scheme.”
(Interview 19, Veriﬁer)
Civil
Environmentalism
Land trusts,
environmental NGOs
“We started promoting
[the idea that] if you’re managing
to optimize carbon, you’re doing
it in a way that is true to the
ecosystem functionality, that you’re
not turning it into a carbon farm.”
(Interview 28, Land Trust)
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Clear resemblances exist between ecological modernization, green govern-
mentality, and civic environmentalism and the main lobbying points of the IFM
protocol stakeholders. Timber industry representatives frequently expressed the
legitimizing claims of ecological modernization, promoting forest offsets as the
most efﬁcient and effective way to mitigate climate change and grow the economy.
In promoting carbon as an additional revenue stream compatible with timber
extraction, which would increase the offset supply, the timber industry mirrored
the state’s concern for creating sufﬁcient carbon offset projects to satisfy cap-and-
trade demand. Veriﬁer and academic stakeholders approximated the green govern-
mentality discourse by operationalizing the methodology, providing the technical
expertise to develop a system of accounting meant to produce credits that were
quantiﬁable and veriﬁable. Through increased baseline conservativeness and pre-
scriptiveness, veriﬁer and academic stakeholders addressed credibility challenges
of the voluntary protocol, which are common to forest offsets generally. Finally,
land trust stakeholders promoted environmental integrity via the production of
co-beneﬁts, in spite of calls to prioritize maximum carbon sequestration, closely
resembling the democratizing safeguards of civic environmentalism.
Important overlap existed between stakeholders’ discursive positions,
echoing the ﬁndings of Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006). For example, all stake-
holder groups emphasized the need for high technological rigor, the purview of
green governmentality. Similarly, co-beneﬁts were ultimately accepted for their
ability to boost perceptions of offsets’ environmental integrity, even among ini-
tial opponents—for instance, forest industry stakeholders. We note that overlap
was especially pronounced in Workgroup Two, suggesting that these narratives
facilitated the regulatory goals of creating sufﬁcient carbon offsets for market
demand, building credibility and measurement precision to meet the expecta-
tions of a regulatory market, and establishing wider buy-in from some in the
environmental community to broaden program support.
Yet the results also show that these perspectives frequently translated to
rival policy objectives. Maintenance of environmental restrictions, the purview
of land trust stakeholders, was resisted by timber industry representatives, who
saw them as barriers to participation and hindrances to offset supply. Conversely,
the possibility of opening the program to larger, industrial landowners offered
the robust participation potential sought by state agents, but it complicated the
task of ensuring the production of co-beneﬁts and brought reactions from environ-
mental advocates outside the protocol negotiation process, who vocally opposed
the inclusion of even-aged management. Finally, increasing the conservativeness
and rigor of the baseline strengthened the credibility of the program in terms of
accuracy and additionality, but reduced project viability among smaller and more
economically marginal landowners—the very landowners often targeted for
conservation—who traditionally have less access to up-front capital, limited tech-
nical capacity, and low inclination to assume restrictive land encumbrances. While
more acres could qualify under the cap-and-trade protocol because large industrial
ownerships could enter, small-scale nonindustrial landowners were largely
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excluded. Here, we reiterate the precision-versus-practicality paradox articulated by
Gosnell et al. (2011). Despite evidence that small-scale landowners could provide
signiﬁcant carbon sequestration potential (Pan et al. 2011), our ﬁndings suggest
that workgroup members privileged, perhaps necessarily, high market strength
and credibility over participation from smaller landowners. Thus, the California
IFM protocol development brought together stakeholder groups of necessary
expertise and interests, yet also forced a difﬁcult balancing between discrete objec-
tives. We note that these tensions resemble negotiations between multiple interest
groups for other environmental commodity programs—for example, forest certi-
ﬁcation, where necessary trade-offs are made in balancing environmental, social,
and economic considerations (Klooster 2010).
This case study has assessed the methodological design preferences of a
speciﬁc group of stakeholders: those with access to protocol development via
workgroup participation, who supported forest carbon commodiﬁcation. Yet
support for forest offsets is not universal. Prior research had directed critical
questions at international forest carbon programs, such as the role of offsets
in perpetuating exploitative labor relations, power inequities, and ecosystem
degradation (Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Corbera and Brown 2010; Lohmann
2009; Sandbrook et al. 2010). Though we have not covered them here, similar
critiques surround California’s marketization of forest offsets. By selecting the
stakeholders for workgroup participation, the state circumscribed whose voices
would contribute to protocol design. One result was that the civic environmen-
talism discourse was only partially represented in IFM protocol development.
The state included reform-oriented groups but excluded more radical critics.
The excluded actors ranged from those who argued that the creation of the
market afﬁrmed existing power structures, to those who saw the commodity
itself as illusory. Some critics played very active roles—attending meetings as
nonparticipant observers and voicing speciﬁc concerns and objectives via public
comment—but ultimately had only minor inﬂuence on the protocol design. This
is a reminder that workgroup participation was not a comprehensive assemblage:
it came by invitation, and the selection favored those professionally involved in
some aspect of forest carbon development. This reinforces the precept that liberal
market environmentalism, considered a hallmark of US climate policy, empowers
certain actors and logics while marginalizing others (Liverman 2004). Future
research should consider alternative models for increasing engagement with
critical discourses in both PES methodological design and implementation.
Conclusion: Looking Globally
California established a methodological precedent by creating a regulatory IFM
protocol, yet it is not unique in harnessing forests as sinks for GHG reduction.
Programs monetizing forest carbon exist globally—both as compliance instru-
ments for emissions trading systems and vehicles for sustainable development,
including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Reduced Emissions
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from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). Recent evidence from a
World Bank carbon pricing survey found 18 emissions trading systems currently
operating across thirty-one countries, with at least thirteen more under consid-
eration (World Bank 2014). This suggests opportunities for policy-makers glob-
ally to draw lessons from California’s IFM protocol development, in their own
considerations of whether and how to commodify forest carbon sequestration.
Speciﬁc design elements of California’s IFM protocol were frequently tai-
lored to the forest inventory data sets, regulatory requirements, and management
practices of the US—especially the baseline and natural forest management
approaches. Thus, they may translate poorly to forests in other geographic con-
texts, particularly those lacking detailed inventory data. Permanence, too, may
need rethinking amid varied tenure arrangements. For example, where state,
community, or tribal ownership of forest resources is common, permanence
may be more easily deﬁned and monitored than in California, where private
ownership necessitates long-term contracts between landowners and state regu-
lators. Alternatively, other aspects of the IFM protocol are more generalizable,
including the targeting of managed forests and the employment of performance
standard baselines. These features were selected to broaden landowner partici-
pation, which was viewed as limited under predecessor programs, such as the
CDM. As of November 2015, the enrollment of 5.3 million forested acres across
138 IFM projects indicates that these design features are promoting participation.7
Global forest-offset programs might therefore consider the beneﬁts of extending
forest carbon methodologies beyond tree planting and avoided deforestation,
which have thus far been the convention.
More importantly, this case study sheds light on the political process through
which vested-interest actors contested access to new carbon-based revenue streams.
We suggest that this clariﬁes the complex process of PES program development, in
which actors make design choices that determine the schemes’ functioning and
effectiveness. Methodologies for forest-offset programs globally will require design
adjustments for particular forest types, regulatory frameworks, land management
contexts, and tenure systems; however, policy-makers will nonetheless need to
contend with who and what to incentivize while discussing appropriate balance
points between broad participation, legitimacy and market reception, and envi-
ronmental integrity, in resemblance to IFM protocol development stakeholders.
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